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Abstract: I discuss two arguments against the view that rea-
sons  are  propositions.  I  consider  responses  to  each  argu-
ment,  including  recent  responses  due  to  Mark  Schroeder,
and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the
discussion  proceeds  by  comparing  reasons  to  answers  and
goals.
1. Introduction
We believe and act based on reasons all the time. But what kind of
thing are these reasons? The question is interesting enough in itself.
Moreover our answer to this ontological question can affect how we
answer  various  normative  questions  about  what  makes  reasons
good or bad, and whether actions or beliefs based on them are justi-
fied,  rational,  proper  and  the  like  (see  e.g.  McDowell  1994,
Williamson 2000, Conee and Feldman 2008, and Turri 2009). This
paper evaluates two arguments against  the view that reasons are
propositions, and suggests responses. I call the view that reasons
are  propositions  abstractionism.  Abstractionism’s  main  rival  is
statism, which says that reasons are mental states of the subject. I
am partial to statism, and have argued extensively for it elsewhere,
1
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so this paper might well be subtitled ‘Advice to My Abstractionist
Friends’.  At  one  time I  thought  that  each of  the  arguments  dis-
cussed below provided evidence against abstractionism, but further
reflection convinced me that they could ultimately be effectively re-
sisted, and the present paper embodies my research in this regard.
Given my preference for statism, I would be happy if what I say here
in defense of abstractionism were proven wrong.
We can appreciate the difference between statism and abstrac-
tionism by considering what they imply about specific cases.1 Take a
typical case of perceptual belief. You see that a chipmunk is dashing
under a bush, and this prompts you to believe that a chipmunk is
dashing under a bush. What’s the basis of this belief? The statist
says it’s your perception that a chipmunk is dashing under a bush.
The abstractionist says it’s the proposition <a chipmunk is dashing
under a bush>. (I use angle brackets to name propositions.) Or take
a typical inferential belief. Suppose Sarah Palin believes that Barack
Obama wants to set up “death panels,” and that if he wants to set up
death  panels,  then  he’s  a  fiend.  This  prompts  her  to  infer  that
Obama is a fiend. What is the basis of this inferential judgment?
The statist says it’s Palin’s belief that Obama wants to set up death
panels, along with her belief that if he wants to set up death panels,
then he’s a fiend. The abstractionist says it’s <Obama wants to set
1 Statists include Davidson (1983: 141), Swain (1981: Chapter 3), Pol-
lock (1986: Chapter 5), Neta (2002: 669), Bergmann (2007), and Turri
(2009). Abstractionists include Darwall (1983: 31–32), Scanlon (1999:
56–57), Brandom (2000: 18), Williamson (2000: Chapter 9), Schroeder
(2007), Miller (2008: Section 2), and Dougherty (forthcoming).
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up death panels> along with <if Obama wants to set up death pan-
els,  then  he’s  a  fiend>.  Generally  speaking,  whenever  the  statist
identifies the reason as mental state M with the content <Q>, the
abstractionist will instead identify it as <Q>.
Let me ward off a few potential misconceptions. First, statism
and  abstractionism  are  theories  of  what  reasons are,  not  about
what makes them good or bad. Second, they are not theories of rea-
sons that there are  to believe or do things.  That is,  they are not
about what in the literature are sometimes called “normative rea-
sons,” which are considerations that count in favor of a belief or ac-
tion. Rather, as I have said, they are theories of the reasons our be-
liefs are based on, or as it’s sometimes put in the literature, “moti-
vating reasons.”2 Third, they are not general theories of the reasons
why we believe things.  When we believe something for a reason,
then of course that reason helps explain our belief. But many things
help explain our belief which aren’t among our reasons for holding
the belief. For instance if Todd Palin deceived Sarah Palin into be-
lieving that Obama wants to set up death panels, it doesn’t follow
that Todd’s deception is among Sarah’s reasons for holding that be-
lief, even though his deception helps explain why she holds it. Fi-
nally, despite the simplicity of the cases I used to illustrate the dif-
ference between abstractionism and statism, both theories can ac-
2 I  hesitate to even mention “normative” and “motivating” reasons,
since, in my experience, people understand the normative/motivat-
ing distinction in a disturbing number of different ways. Let me em-
phasize that nothing at all in my discussion turns on the “normative/
motivating” terminology. See Turri 2009 for more on why I think the
distinction is largely irrelevant to present concerns.
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commodate cases where a belief is based on multiple reasons, or
multiple lines of reasoning.
The next two sections each focus on one argument against ab-
stractionism. Each argument shares the same basic form.3
Reasons are F.
Propositions are not F.
So reasons are not propositions.
If  either  argument  were  to  succeed,  it  would  be  a  considerable
metaphysical  discovery  with  potentially  serious  implications  for
ethics and epistemology.
2. The Problem of Possession
 The first argument is:
Possessionless
A1. You can have reasons.
A2. You can’t have propositions.
C. So reasons aren’t propositions.
A1 is obviously true.4 What about A2? It can seem absurd to say that
someone has a proposition, and so it can easily seem that the argu-
ment succeeds. I would now like to consider a couple ways of resist-
ing the argument, one of which I find wanting, the other of which I
find more promising.
3 Compare  Dougherty’s  (forthcoming)  presentation  of  Williamson’s
(2000: Chapter 9) arguments.
4 What it is to have a reason has recently received attention; e.g. see
Schroeder 2008, and relatedly Turri 2010.
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First,  abstractionists  might  argue that we don’t  literally  have
the reasons our beliefs and actions are based on, but instead “have”
them in some metaphorical sense in which it is plausible that we
can “have” propositions.5 This strategy won’t convince unless sup-
ported by some actual linguistic data suggesting that we’re dealing
with non-literal talk. But I doubt such data is forthcoming. Indeed
the data suggest that ‘have’ in ‘have a reason’ is used literally.
Consider these sentences:
1. Maria has one bat she strikes baseballs with.
2. Maria has one bat she feeds live crickets to.
3. Maria has one bat she strikes baseballs with and one she
feeds live crickets to.
1 and 2 both sound fine. But 3 strikes us as odd because ‘one bat’
refers to a baseball bat, whereas ‘one’ then refers to a small flying
mammal. 1 and 2 cannot properly reduce and conjoin to form 3.
This shows that ‘bat’ isn’t used synonymously in 1 and 2. (See Bach
1998). Consider also these sentences:
4. Maria swam across a river.
5. Maria cried a river.
6. Maria swam across a river, and cried another.
4 and 5 each sound fine on their own, but cannot properly reduce
and conjoin to form 6, because ‘river’ is used metaphorically or id-
iomatically in 5 but not 4. Now consider these sentences:
7. Mario has a business.
8. Mario has several reasons for believing his business will
5 As an anonymous referee suggested.
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flourish.
9. Mario has a business and several reasons for believing it
will flourish.
7 and 8 reduce and conjoin to form 9. 9 sounds just fine, indicating
that ‘has’ has a literal meaning either in both 7 and 8, or in neither.
Since it has a literal meaning in 7, it does in 8 too.
Second,  abstractionists  might  argue,  as  Mark  Schroeder  has,
that by endorsing Possessionless, we succumb to a tempting mis-
take due to an ambiguity of ‘have’.6 Sometimes ‘X has Y’ means ‘X
possesses Y’. But often times ‘X has Y’ means ‘X stands in salient re-
lation R to Y’ (or vice versa). For example, ‘I have a father’ means
that someone stands in the father relation to me. It doesn’t mean
that I possess a father.7 And of course we can stand in relations to
propositions. So if we can understand ‘I have a reason’ to mean that
a proposition stands in the reason relation to me, then we can deny
A2.
It’s true that ‘have’ generally behaves this way, and that we can
stand  in  relations  to  propositions.  But  it  isn’t  clear  that  this  is
enough to enable a convincing response to the argument. I’ll first
explain why this response, as it stands, might fail to convince. Then
I’ll explain why I believe that something in the neighborhood fares
better.
We can contrive contexts where it sounds okay to say ‘I have the
6 Mark  Schroeder,  personal  communication;  compare  Schroeder
2008.
7 At least, it doesn’t  usually mean this. One can imagine morally ob-
jectionable circumstances in which it would.
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proposition <Sarah published a book>’. Suppose you and I are play-
ing a strange game. The game is to see who can think about their as-
signed proposition for the longest time. You get assigned <Barack
published a book>, and I get assigned <Sarah published a book>. A
third party enters and asks, ‘Who’s supposed to be thinking about
Sarah?’. I respond, ‘I am. I have the proposition <Sarah published a
book>’. This sounds fine. Now given that we can generate this effect
in the context of our strange game, if Schroeder’s response to Pos-
sessionless were correct, then we should expect it to sound okay to
say ‘I  have  the  proposition <Sarah published a  book>’  when it’s
salient that this proposition is my reason for believing something.
But that doesn’t happen. Consider: I say, ‘Sarah published some-
thing’. Everyone asks what my reason is for thinking this. I respond,
‘Sarah  published  a  book’.  Everyone  believes  me.  It  still  sounds
ridiculous for me to say, ‘So I  have the proposition <Sarah pub-
lished a book>’. And it would likewise sound ridiculous for others to
say of me, ‘He has the proposition <Sarah published a book>’. Con-
sider a different case. Barack and Joe both believe that Sarah pub-
lished something. We ask them what their reasons are for thinking
this. Barack says, ‘Sarah published a book’; Joe says, ‘Sarah pub-
lished a journal article’.  We all  believe that they’re being sincere.
Now  someone  asks,  ‘So  which  of  these  two  gentleman  has  the
proposition <Sarah published a book>?’. The question is unintelli-
gible. But it wouldn’t be unintelligible if the abstractionist proposal
currently under consideration were true.
Let me put the worry slightly differently. Even when the reason
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relation is salient — because, say, we’ve just been asked what our
reason is for believing Sarah published something, and we respond
by saying ‘She published a book’ — it still  sounds awful to say ‘I
have the proposition <Sarah published a book>’. We can think of
other contexts where it makes sense to say you have that proposi-
tion, contexts where we could understand what relation ‘have’ picks
out. (This is the point of my ‘strange game’ example above.) But it
makes no sense in the context of the reason relation. Why would
that be, if the reason relation relates us to the proposition in ques-
tion, and that fact is very salient in the context? Why would ‘have’
have such a hard time picking out the reason relation? Why can’t we
hear it that way?
That’s  one  basis  for  being  dissatisfied  with  Schroeder’s  re-
sponse. But lurking in the neighborhood is a related, complemen-
tary, and perhaps more effective response.
The alternative response features the locution ‘have, as an F’.
We can say things like ‘I have, as my answer, the number 2’ and ‘I
have, as my main goal, a cure for malaria’. Save for special contexts,
from those statements we cannot infer either ‘I have the number 2’
or ‘I have a cure for malaria’. Likewise, from the statement ‘I have,
as  my  reason,  the  proposition  <Sarah  published  a  book>’,  we
should not  expect  to  be able  to  conclude ‘I  have the proposition
<Sarah published a book>’.
Returning now to Possessionless, we can see that it straightfor-
wardly begs the question, provided that ‘have’  is understood in a
way relevant to the debate over the nature of reasons. In order to
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ensure  that  ‘have’  refers  to  the  relevant  relation  throughout,  we
need to read it like so:
A1'. You can have, as reasons, reasons.
A2'. You can’t have, as reasons, propositions.
C. So reasons aren’t propositions.
But then A2' obviously begs the question.8
I have one residual worry about this latest response. Once it’s
clear that we’re talking about the answer relation or the goal rela-
tion, we can hear the unadorned ‘have’ as predicating the relevant
relation.  So if  I  say,  ‘I  have,  as  my answer,  the number 4.  What
about you?’, you can respond, ‘I have the number 8’. That sounds
fine – we unproblematically hear it as involving the ‘have, as an an-
swer’  relation. And if I say, ‘I have, as my goal,  a cure for AIDS.
What about you?’, you can respond, ‘I have a cure for malaria’. We
hear this as involving the ‘have, as a goal’ relation. But if I say, ‘I
have,  as  my  reason,  the  claim  that  she  published  a  book.  What
about you?’, it’s not entirely clear that you can felicitously respond,
‘I have the claim that she published an article’. It isn’t clear that we
hear this as predicating the reason relation, or even whether it’s ac-
ceptable.9 Perhaps we must  always say ‘I  have,  as my reason’ to
hear it as predicating the reason relation. It’s an open question how
significant this disanalogy is between reason-talk on the one hand,
8 Perhaps ‘have’ always means ‘have, as an F’. If so, all the better for
the  response  to  Possessionless  just  sketched.  But  the  response
doesn’t require this. It’s enough that the abstractionist can liken talk
of having reasons to other respectable ‘have’-talk, such as having
answers or goals.
9 My correspondents are ambivalent on the question.
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and answer-talk or goal-talk on the other.
3. The Problem of Powerlessness
Here is the second argument.
Powerless
B1. Reasons are causes.
B2. Propositions don’t cause anything.
C. So reasons aren’t propositions.
Why accept B1? Because reasons must explain the attitudes based
on them, and the best account of reasons’ explanatory role is that
they are  causes,  so  reasons  are  causes  (compare Davidson 1963:
10).10 Why accept B2? Because propositions are non-spatiotemporal
objects, and all non-spatiotemporal objects are causally powerless,
so propositions are causally powerless.11 Notice how easily statism
accommodates  the  causal  profile  of  reasons:  mental  states  can
cause one another, and reasons just are mental states, so reasons
can be causes.12
Abstractionists might object to the argument for B1. They might
dispute the claim that the best account of reasons’ explanatory role
is that they are causes. It’s natural to think that this would require
10 For an extended explanation and defense of the causal theory of
reasons, see Turri unpublished.
11 Compare Benacerraf’s (1973) famous argument against platonism in
mathematics.
12 I take it that something like this line of thought helps motivate David-
son’s identification of a “primary reason” as the combination of “a
belief and an attitude” (later: an “intention”), given that Davidson
thinks that reasons explain action by causing it (1963: 6–11).
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defending  an  alternative  account  of  their  explanatory  role.  But
progress on this front has been minimal (Wilson 1989, Ginet 1990,
Mele 2003: Chapter 2, and Turri unpublished). However there’s an
alternative strategy.13 The strategy is to claim that although it is true
that your having the reason must cause your belief, it isn’t true that
the reason itself must cause your belief. It’s a subtle distinction be-
tween  a reason causing the belief and  your having of the reason
causing the belief, and because everyone agrees that you must have
a reason in order for your belief to be based on it, the abstractionist
can explain why many people have mistakenly thought the causal
theory seemed so obviously true.
The strategy is interesting, though there’s some reason not to be
entirely satisfied with it. First, after carefully considering the pro-
posal, I find it implausible that I’m making the mistake it attributes
to me. I doubt that I would mistake the causal efficacy of having a
reason for the efficacy of the reason itself, any more than I’d mis-
take, for example, the causal efficacy of  having a dog  for the effi-
cacy of the dog itself. This is especially true in a context where the
potential mistake has been explicitly suggested, and we’re on alert.
Second, the proposal says, ‘while it is true that your having the rea-
son must cause your belief, it isn’t true that the reason itself must
cause  your  belief,’  but  abstractionism  actually  entails  something
much stronger. If abstractionism is true, then not only is it true that
reasons need not cause your belief, it’s also true that reasons could
13 An anonymous referee first suggested this strategy to me. See also
Schroeder 2007: Chapter 1.
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not possibly cause your belief, or anything else for that matter. This
consequence  is  much more difficult  to  accept  than the  relatively
modest claim that  sometimes reasons explain by virtue of a non-
causal relation, which is the most formidable response to B1, and
the most popular one in the literature on causal theories of reasons
for both action and belief.14
But  I  will  set  aside  these  worries,  since  my  main  concern
presently lies elsewhere. I think this new suggestion for responding
to B1 could be bolstered by producing analogous cases where the
having of X causes Y, but X itself does not. For unless we find such
analogs, the strategy will look like special pleading, resting on a rad-
ical and unprecedented causal asymmetry between the having of X
and X itself. And here I think we might once again profit from com-
paring reasons to answers and goals.
My having the answer to a question might cause me to win a
prize, but the answer itself, <Topeka is the capital of Kansas>, does
not. My having the goal of curing malaria might cause me to study
parasitology, but the goal itself,  to cure malaria, does not. In each
of these cases, it seems that my being in a certain state with a cer-
14 An anonymous referee asks, “If you already accept that reasons are
not causes, why would you be bothered by the implication that in
no possible world reasons are causes?” I don’t see it as my aim here
to convince such a person. My point is that opponents of the causal
theory of reasons have, by and large, responded by arguing that it’s
possible for some reasons to explain non-causally. (B1 is supposed to
be a necessary truth about the nature of reasons, so a possible case
would be enough.) But no clear example of such a case has been
offered. This would be  surprising if reasons  necessarily explain non-
causally.
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tain content  — my believing that Topeka is the capital of Kansas,
and my aiming to cure malaria  — causes the  relevant outcomes,
even though it’s implausible that the abstract representational con-
tent of those states could cause anything.
4. Conclusion
The analogy between reasons on the one hand, and answers and
goals on the other, offers aid and comfort to abstractionists. Further
benefit is gained by pointing out how natural it is to speak of our
beliefs and actions as being based on answers and goals, e.g. ‘His
belief is based on the answer to the previous question’ and ‘Her ac-
tions were based on her goal to finish at the top of her class’. One
satisfying outcome for abstractionists would be for reasons to  just
be answers and goals.15 They might do well to explore this possibil-
ity further.16
15 In the final analysis, preferences will probably also feature in the ac-
count.
16 For helpful feedback and advice, I happily thank Thom Brooks, Don
Hubin, Clayton Littlejohn, and two generous and astute anonymous
referees. Special thanks go to Angelo Turri and Mark Schroeder.
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